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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MARK PLASKON, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent. : 
vs. : 
DARWIN S. HAYES, BETH HAYES, : Case No. 900587CA 
DUANE H. JENKINS, CARMA JENKINS, : 
dba DOUBLE D STORAGE GARAGES, : 
Defendants/Petitioners. : 
OPINIONS BELOW 
On November 22, 1991 the Utah Court of Appeals, in a 
unanimous decision reversed the Order and Judgment of the Trial 
Court. The Decision is attached as Appendix lfAlf and the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Trial Court is attached as 
Appendix ffB,f. 
JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff does not dispute the jurisdiction of this Court to 
consider a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review an Order of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
1 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 38-3-1 as amended (1953) 
The text of this statute is set out verbatim in Appendix "C". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Disposition Below 
This case arises out of the Plaintiff's claims against the 
Defendants as owners of a storage unit in Bountiful, Utah, wherein 
the allegation was that they improperly sold personal property 
stored in the storage unit without giving notice and without 
conducting a Sheriff's Sale pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 38-3-1 as amended (1953) . 
The Trial was held in the Second Judicial District Court for 
Davis County, State of Utah before the Honorable Douglas L 
Cornaby, sitting without a jury. 
That the Court entered its ruling October 31
 r 199 0 and 
Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals on November 20, 1990. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court on November 22, 
1991. 
Statement of the Facts 
The Plaintiff, in June of 1987, resided in Bountiiul, Utah 
with an individual by the name of Paulette McFarland. u 9) At 
that time, the Plaintiff owned a large number of ducK and game 
bird decoys which he utilized in a guide service- guiding 
2 
individuals on private hunting trips in the Northern part of the 
State of Utah. (Tp. 10-11) 
That difficulties arose between Plaintiff and McFarland, 
causing McFarland to move all of the Plaintiff's belongings, 
including the decoys, from their residence to a storage unit. 
That on or about July 11, 1987, McFarland went to the Double 
D Storage Unit owned by the Defendants in this action and moved 
Plaintiff's property into a particular unit. (Tp. 68-69) 
That at that time, a document entitled "Double D Storage 
Garage Rental Agreement11 was signed. The agreement, although 
filled out by McFarland, indicated that "I, Mark J. Plaskon, agree 
to rent storage unit 108 for a period of one (1) month for a total 
of $4 0, plus $2 key deposit!f. The document was actually filled 
out by Paulette McFarland (Tp. 35) in Plaintiff fs name and 
countersigned by Carma Jenkins, one of the owners of Double D 
Storage Garage. (Tp. 69) 
In addition, McFarland told Jenkins that while she would pay 
the first months1 rent, Plaintiff would be responsible for any 
thereafter and this was acceptable with Jenkins and she knew that 
Plaintiff was to be the responsible party. (Tp. 69-70) 
That following this initial conversation and the initiation 
of the storage unit, the Defendants had no further contact with 
Paulette McFarland and on various occasions, sent notices of 
delinquency to Plaintiff. (Tp. 71) 
That after a number of unsuccessful attempts to contact the 
Plaintiff about delinquent rent through the period of 1987 and 
3 
1988, the decision was made to sell the contents of the unit. All 
four (4) of the Defendants made the unanimous decision. (Tp. 76) 
That no notice was ever sent to the Plaintiff concerning the 
sale of the property pursuant to Section 38-3-1 UCA (1990), nor 
was there a Sheriff's Sale or any public notice of a sale. (Tp. 
78) Simply a private sale to an individual named James Kenneth 
Oswald, which took place in June of 1988 for $500. (Tp. 54-56) 
That the matter came on for Trial on October 4, 1990. That 
the parties were directed by Judge Cornaby to consider the issue 
of standing of the Plaintiff initially with witnesses and that the 
decision would be made as to whether or not he had such standing 
before the damage issue would be determined. (Tp. 3) In 
furtherance of that request, the Plaintiff called Plaintiff, 
Paulette McFarland, Carma Jenkins, Darwin Hayes and Duane Jenkins, 
all of whom acknowledged that while Paulette McFarland had 
actually filled out the rental agreement, it was filled out in 
Plaintiff's name and that all parties to the transaction knew that 
Plaintiff was the responsible party for the payment of rent on the 
storage unit. In fact, counsel for the Defendants admits in the 
opening portions of his closing statement, 
"Your honor, I am going to agree with Mr. 
Caine on a lot of what he said, particularly 
involving whether or not the parties looked 
to Mr. Plaskon as a liable party under this 
contract. I think that has been clearly 
established." (Tp. Ill) 
The Court however, determined that there was no contract 
between Plaintiff and Defendants, but that the contract was 
between McFarland and Double D. That Plaintiff could only look to 
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McFarland and that the Defendants had violated Section 38-3-1 UCA 
in not giving the Plaintiff proper notice of the sale and 
therefore, based on the finding of no standing, the case was 
dismissed. 
It is from that decision that the Plaintiff filed an appeal 
which was heard by the Court of Appeals,, On November 22, 1991 the 
Court unanimously reversed Judge Cornaby. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS APPROPRIATELY REVERSED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION AND ACCORDINGLY THIS COURT SHOULD DENY 
DEFENDANTS' PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AS THERE IS 
NO SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASON FOR GRANTING REVIEW BY A 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Review by a Writ of Certiorari is a matter of judicial 
discretion, not a right, and is granted only for "special and 
important reasons". Utah Supreme Court Rule 43. Rule 43 states 
the type of reasons that should be considered for granting 
Certiorari. This Court may review a Court of Appeals case when 
the Court decision conflicts with another Court of Appeals 
decision or a decision of this Court, or when the Court of Appeals 
makes an extreme departure from the usual course of judicial 
proceedings or when the decision involves an important question of 
law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court. 
This case does not fall within any of these categories. 
This is a simple case of the Plaintiff contracting with the 
Defendants (which was admitted by all parties) for the use of a 
storage unit. Plaintiff defaulted in the payment and the 
5 
Defendants simply did not follow the appropriate procedures set 
forth in the statutory provisions of the law to sell his personal 
property. 
The Trial Court found that indeed the Defendants had not 
complied with the terms of the Utah statute, but determined that 
there was no "privity of contract" between the Plaintiff and 
Defendants and therefore, he could not proceed. This finding was 
in direct contradiction of the testimony of all the parties and 
the admission on behalf of the Defendants1 counsel in the 
arguments at the conclusion of the case. 
While it was true that the actual agreement was signed by the 
Plaintiff's then girlfriend, the agreement was in Plaintiff's 
name, he acknowledged that he was bound, all other correspondence 
concerning the Plaintiff's default was directed to him, it was 
Plaintiff's property that was stored in the unit and Defendants, 
themselves, acknowledged that they believed that Plaintiff had a 
contract with them and that he was responsible for payment to 
them. There was simply no basis for Judge Cornaby, under the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence, to simply conclude for his 
own reasons that there was no contract and the Court of Appeals, 
after reviewing the record, found that he had committed reversible 
error in so finding. 
This is simply a case where the Trial Court erred on the 
facts and on the law on that portion of Plaintiff's claim wherein 
a contract was established between the parties. The Appellate 
Court easily recognized this and in an unanimous decision reversed 
6 
and on the basis that the Trial Court had already determined that 
the Defendants had not complied with the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 38-3-1 as amended (1953) in selling the 
property and that the matter be remanded for evidentiary hearing 
on the issue of Plaintifffs damages. 
There are no special or compelling reasons to grant a Writ. 
This is not new law, nor does it contradict existing law, but is 
simply a situation where a Judge made an error on the facts and 
the Appellate Court correctly reversed it. 
CONCLUSION 
Because there are no "special and important reasons" for 
granting a Petition for Writ of Certiorari it should therefore, be 
denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \ VJ7 Aay of January, 1992. 
JOHN 7TT C A I N E \ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Opposition to counsel for the Defendants, 
James B. Hanks, Attorney at Law, 175 East 400 South, Suite #330, 
Salt Lake City,Utah 84111-2314, postctoer-prepaid this IKJL? day of 
January, 1992. 
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FILED 
NOV 2 21991 
Mark Plaskon, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Darwin S. Hayes, et al., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ^ 
ooOoo 
ORDER OF REVERSAL 
Case No. 910124-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Garff, and Jackson (Rule 31) 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Utah R. App, P, 
31, 
We determine that the trial court erred in finding that no 
contract existed between plaintiff and defendants. Based on the 
court's further finding that the sale was not conducted pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 38-3-1, et seq. (1988), we reverse the 
judgment for derenrlants and remand for a determination of the 
damages incurred by plaintiff. 
•? n j. t. V DATED thi of November , 1 9 9 1 , 
Ncfrman H. 
'OV 2 : 'Jl n'-C 
APPENDIX "B" 
JAMES B. HANKS - #4331 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 . 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Attorney for Defendants 
^ i (bursa 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK PLASKON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DARWIN S. ^ HAYES, .BETH HAYES, 
DUANE H. JENKINS, CARMA 
JENKINS, dba DOUBLE D 
STORAGE GARAGES, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No 890746591CV 
This matter came before the court for trial on 
Thursday, October 4, 1990. The defendants were represented 
by James B. Hanks of Kipp and Christian, P.C. The plaintiff 
was represented by John T. Caine. The court, having 
considered the evidence presented and being fully informed 
in the premises, now makes the following: 
FILMED 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendants are the owners of the Double D 
Storage Garages located in Davis County, State of Utah, 
2. On July 11, 1987, Paulette McFarland signed a 
rental contract with the defendants for the rental of Unit 
108 of the Double D Storage Garages. At the time the 
document was signed, she made the defendants aware that the 
property to be stored therein belonged to Mark Plaskon. She 
further stated that she would only be responsible for the 
first month's rent ($40.00) and what happened thereafter 
would be between the defendants and Mr. Plaskon. All 
parties understood that. 
3. Plaintiff's Exhibit "2" was signed by Paulette 
McFarland, not Mark Plaskon. 
4. The defendants expected the plaintiff to show 
up after the first month and begin paying monthly rent or 
move his things out. The plaintiff did not do so. His 
property remained in Unit 108 until November, 1988 when he 
bought a home and moved in with Paulette McFarland. At this 
time, much of his furniture and clothing had been moved out 
of the storage shed, leaving only various duck decoys. 
5. The plaintiff never contacted the defendants 
to establish a rental contract concerning Unit 108. 
-2-
6. The plaintiff was sent notices of Past-Due 
rent on a regular basis but never made any response. 
7. The defendants sent plaintiff a Notice of Sale 
of the contents of Unit 108 to 111 Wicker Lane, Bountiful, 
Utah* The notice should have been addressed to 14 Acorn 
Drive in North Salt Lake because an earlier notice was sent 
to this address (Notice of May 23, 1988) and it did reach 
him. 
8. The defendants checked Unit 108 from time-to-
time. When they checked with the plaintiff's former 
employer and learned that he was no longer employed, they 
checked the unit and found that the furniture had been moved 
out and nothing but decoys remained. 
9. The documents set forth as plaintiff's Exhibit 
"1" were sent to the plaintiff with the notation "we do have 
a smaller unit if you still want one. We need to hear from 
you." This notice was sent on May 23, 1988. The plaintiff 
did not respond. 
10. The court is aware of a conversation which the 
plaintiff claimed took place in which he made arrangements 
to pay the balance of rents due in the fall of 1988. The 
court does not believe that such an arrangement was made 
because of the way the defendants conducted their 
business. The court does not believe that the defendants 
-3-
would let things go for approximately 14 months without any 
rent and just say " Well, sure. Contact us when you get 
around to it, to having some money." They testified that's 
not the way they do business. 
11. The plaintiff never did sign a contract with 
the defendants or enter into an oral or written agreement 
with them. The plaintiff did not pay the defendants any 
amounts for rent. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff did not have a rental contract 
for the storage of his personal property with the 
defendants. 
2. Section 38-3-1 of Utah Code Annotated sets 
forth the procedure for executing on a lien concerning 
property held in a self-service storage facility. 
3. Because of a nonpayment of rent, the 
defendants had a lien on the contents of Unit 108 in the 
Double-D Storage Garage. 
4. When the defendants disposed of the property 
contained in Unit 108 of the Double D Storage facility, they 
did not follow the procedures set forth in the above-named 
statute. 
5. Paulette McFarland was not an agent of the 
-4-
plaintiff nor were Ms. McFarland!s rental agreements with 
the defendants ratified by the plaintiff. The defendants 
had a contract with Paulette McFarland, not the plaintiff. 
Any complaint that the plaintiff has is with Paulette 
McFarland. 
6. There is no privity of contract between the 
plaintiff and the defendants. 
DATED this 5/ day of October, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONOK^BI^ Er DOUGCAS 'L.~ CORNABY/ 
- 5 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, first-class, postage prepaid on the 1 
day o£ October,, 1990/ a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the 
following: 
John T. Caine 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
^KiAoJP/r 
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JAMES B. HANKS - #4331 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Attorney for Defendants 
FILED INC rcv< ....,,. 
DAVIS --:V,?frlC£ 
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' 3 ! llssflfSQ 
CLERK,C"; 
BY. 
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JOL'RT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK PLASKON, 
vs 
Plaintiff, 
DARWIN S. HAYES, BETH HAYES, 
DUANE H. JENKINS, CARMA 
JENKINS, dba DOUBLE D 
STORAGE GARAGES, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 890746591CV 
This matter_came before the court for trial on the 
4th day of October, 1990. The plaintiff was represented by 
John T. Caine. The defendants were represented by James B. 
Hanks of Kipp and Christian, P.C. The court, having heard 
the evidence produced at trial and being fully informed in 
the premises: 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
Plaintiff's complaint against the defendants is 
hereby dismissed because of a lack of contractual privity 
FILMED 
between the p a r t i e s . 
DATED t h i s 3/ day of October , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
<7^ 
E DOUGLAS T,. CORNAB^ 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, first-class, postage prepaid on the R 
day of October, 1990, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order, to the following: 
John T. Caine 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
-3-
APPENDIX »C" 
CHAPTER 3 
LESSORS' LIENS 
Section Section 
38-3 1 Lien for rent due 38 3 6 Execution of writ of a t tachment 
38-3 2 Priori ty of lessor's hen 38 3 7 Release of a t tachment — Bona 
38-3 3 At tachment in aid of hen 38 3 8 When chapter not applicable 
38-3 4 At tachment — Affidavit and bond 
38-3 5 When a t t achment will issue — De 
terminat ion of p n o n t i e s 
38-3-1. Lien for rent due. 
Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall have a lien for rent due "upon 
all nonexempt property of the lessee brought or kept upon the leased premises 
so long as the lessee shall occupy said premises and for thirty days thereafter 
His to ry R S 1898 & C L 1907, § 1407, 
C J ^ 1917, § 3776, L 1931, c h 7, § 2, R ,S 
1933 & C 1943, 52 3 1 
ANALYSIS 
Attachment and duration of hen 
Cumulative or executive remedy 
Duration of lien 
Exemptions 
Extent of l ien 
Priorities 
Privity 
Release of exempt property 
Thirty-day period 
Waiver or loss of jurisdiction 
A t t achmen t a n d d u r a t i o n of h e n 
Lessor's s ta tu tory hen for r en t at taches from 
the beginning of tenancy and continues for 
thirty days after occupation by lessee ceases 
Eason v Wheelock, 101 U t a h 162, 120 P 2d 
319 (1941) 
Cumula t i ve o r e x e c u t i v e r e m e d y 
The remedy given by th is section and 
§§ 38 3 2 to 38 3 8 is cumulat ive, and landlord 
may still proceed in equity to foreclose his lien, 
notwithstanding its provisions Houston Real 
Estate Inv Co v Hechler, 44 Utah 64, 138 P 
1159 (1914) 
Dura t ion of h e n 
By the express terms of th i s section, the les 
sors s ta tutory hen te rminates 31 days after 
the lessee has quit the premises to preserve 
their hens lessors must comply with the terms 
established by §§ 38 3 3 to 38 3 6 Citizens 
Bank v Elks B ldg , N V , 663 P 2d 5o (Utah 
1983) 
Cross References — Attachment, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 64C -x. 
Exemptions from execution, § 78 23 _ 
The landlord's possession of lessee's property 
i left on the premises after the lessee hac qui t 
the premises did not extend the landlord.. s t a t 
; utory hen beyond the 30 day period C tizens 
i Bank v Elks Bldg , N V , 663 P 2d 56 OJtah 
1983) 
E x e m p t i o n s 
3 Alfalfa seed and hay held exempt uncer for 
d mer §§ 104 37 13, 104 37 14, Code 19*0 (now 
i> repealed) Ray v Cox, 83 U t a h 499, 3D P 2d 
A 1062 (1934) 
> 
E x t e n t of h e n 
Landlord s lien is only for amount of ren t due 
and may not include attorney's fee Mar- J a n e 
5
 Stevens Co \ Pole) 67 U tah 578, 248 ° 815 i r
 (1926) 
i P r io r i t i e s 
LS The lessor s statutory hen for rent is suDordi 
 nate to a purchase money mortgage which 
mortgage, though unrecorded, is valid as be-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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LESSORS' LIENS 38-3-5 
3-4. Attachment — Affidavit and bond. 
he lessor-shall before the issue of such-writ of attachment file"a complaint, 
an:affidavit duly sworn to setting7forth-the amount over and ' 
ve all.offsets and counterclaims and a brief'description of the.leased prem-
, and shall further state, under oath that such writ of attachment is not 
I out for the purpose of vexing or harassing the lessee; and the person 
lying for such writ of attachment shall execute and file a bond as in other 
\s of attachment. 
story: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1410; 
1917, § 3779; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
avit requirements. ; 
lelp eviction is tort.•*. 
avit requirements. 
idavit by landlord which states that writ 
. brought 'to hinder, delay or defraud any 
•,or of said defendants" does not comply 
this section. Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. 
>rn States Whsle. Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266,. 
\2d 778 (1969). 
Self-help eviction is tort. 
Where a tenant has not abandoned the prem-
ises, a landlord commits a tort if he disregards 
judicial process and resorts to self-help" by 
evicting a tenant and seizing the tenant's prop-
erty. Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 
1985). / 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
.. Ju r . 2d. — 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord 
%enant § 692. 
.S. — 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant 
Key Numbers. 
260. 
Landlord and Tenant • 
1-5. When at tachment will issue — Determination of 
priorities. 
on the filing of such complaint, affidavit and bond it shall be the duty, of 
:ourt wherein the same are filed'to issue a writ of attachment to.the. 
IT officer, commanding him to seize the property of the defendant subject 
ch lien, or so much thereof as will satisfy the demand, and to make-a 
mination of the priorities of the claims, liens,; and security interests in 
property. 
ory: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1411; 
1917, § 3780; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
L. 1977, ch. 272, § 51. 
553 
38-3-6 LIENS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant • Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant'<*=» 
§ 572. - 260. 
38-3-6. Execution of writ of attachment. 
It shall be the duty of the officer to whom the writ of attachment is directed 
to seize the property of such lessee subject to such lien, or as much thereof as 
shall be necessary to satisfy such debt and costs, and to keep the same until 
the determination of the action, unless the property is sooner released by bond 
or the attachment is discharged. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1412; 
C.L. 1917, § 3781; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
52-3-6. 
38-3-7. Release of a t tachment — Bond. 
A bond for the release of the attached property may be given, and motion to 
discharge the attachment may be made, as provided in the Code of Civil 
Procedure in cases of attachment. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1413; Cross-References. — Attachment,'Rules of 
C.L. 1917, § 3782; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, Civil Procedure3 Rule 64C. 
52-3-7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Release of property.- erty without bond as required by this section 
Where exempt property is attached by lessor and former section 104-18-22, Code 1943 (now 
claiming statutory lien, court does not act in repealed). Ray v. Cox, 83 Utah 499,- 30 P.2d 
excess of jurisdiction .in releasing such prop- 1062 (1934). 
38-3-8.- When chapter not applicable. 
•This chapter shall.not be applicable to a written lease for a term of years in 
which;.yas;part.of the consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect a 
building-or "improvements upon" the leased premises. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1415; 
C.L.-1917, § 3784; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
52-3-8. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Ju r . 2d. — 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant «=» 
and Tenant § 686. 241. 
C.J.S. — 52'C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant 
§ 620. 
554 
